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The Dangers of Decentralization 
Clientelism, the State, & Nature in a Democratic Indonesia* 
 
Shane Joshua Barter, University of British Columbia 
Department of Political Science, PhD Candidate 
 
 
Throughout the Cold War and after, Southeast Asian dictatorships lay somewhere between 
predatory and developmental states, posting high growth rates but with equally high costs.  
Rulers such as Sarit, Marcos, and Suharto were surrounded by networks of patrons and clients 
that went all the way to the village level.  These regimes were as agnostic towards environmental 
effects of their modernization programmes as they were towards democracy, the rule of law, and 
the rights of their citizens.  Even though economic growth improved the livelihoods of their 
populations, Southeast Asian countries were left with weak states, clientelist social structures, 
and severe environmental damage.  A solution offered by activists and academics alike was the 
creation of decentralized, democratic systems where communities could have greater control 
over political power and natural resources.  The ‘Third Wave’ of democratization in Southeast 
Asia, from 14 October, to EDSA, to Reformasi helped realize these hopes. 
 In Indonesia, the fall of Suharto, fair elections, and radical decentralization have brought 
impressive changes.  But in remote regions and specific sectors, decentralization has meant a 
weaker state, more clientelism, and continued environmental destruction.  This presents the kind 
of conceptual puzzle so sought after by academics, with real-world implications cherished by 
activists and governments.  What accounts for the uneven impacts of democratization and 
decentralization on state capacity and corruption, and what does this mean for environmental 
sustainability? 
 This essay is an initial stride towards a larger research project on institutional change and 
illegal logging in Indonesia.1  The first section examines theories of state and society.  I begin by 
discussing Migdal’s weak state, strong society model to illustrate the challenges faced by 
reformers.  Then I turn to clientelism, a persistent form of social organization which explains 
why weak states face continued resistance.  In the second section, I look at centralized rule and 
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clientelism in Indonesia.  In the third, I turn to the ongoing experiment of radical decentralization 
in Indonesia and its initial effects on illegal logging.  I conclude with a tentative look forward. 
It should be made clear that I am not critical of decentralization.   I argue that 
decentralization is a necessary, but not a sufficient step to achieve greater accountability and 
sustainability.  When controls from above are eliminated, it is important that checks from below 
are already in place.  Without democracy, decentralization may compound the problems created 
by clientelist systems.  The relationship between democracy and decentralization is partially 
reinforcing; decentralization first requires democracy to be effective, while decentralization 
deepens democracy by allowing local autonomy, greater responsiveness, and more effective 
representation.  Decentralizing a clientelist system may simply cut the top off the pyramid, 
eliminating the central governments that held lower levels in check. 
 
I: State & Society, Power & Structure 
This section introduces two related concepts which help explain why illegal logging persists.  
First, Migdal’s ‘weak state’ approach illustrates why some countries lack control over policy 
sectors which are dominated by strong societal forces.  Second, I discuss clientelism, a form of 
social organization which undermines state capacity and drives various forms of corruption, 
including illegal logging.  This will lead me to a discussion of these concepts in the context of 
Indonesia. 
 In recent years, political scientists have attempted to ‘bring the state back in’.  Early 
political science was mostly concerned with a state’s formal structures, but after World War Two, 
the discipline shifted to a society-oriented one.  In the 1980s, a number of scholars spearheaded a 
return to formal theorizing about the state: its evolution, autonomy, capacity, and institutions.  
While they demanded greater attention to the state, these scholars did not suggest a new grand 
theory at the expense of an emphasis on society.  For Skocpol, “bringing the state back in…does 
not require a break with some of the most encompassing social-determinist assumptions of 
pluralism, structural functionalist developmentalism, and various neo-Marxisms.”2  As a result, 
political scientists increasingly view state and society as codetermined. 
 Migdal exemplifies state / society approaches.  In Strong Societies and Weak States, he 
examines “the capabilities of states to achieve the kinds of changes that their leaders have 
sought.”3  Why are some states capable of doing what they want while others remain weak?  
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Migdal responds that the state must compete with societal organizations for the ability and the 
right to define rules.  To illustrate this struggle, Migdal creates a matrix of strong states with 
weak societies (Western democracies), strong societies with weak states (developing countries) 
and weak states with weak societies (anarchy).  In later work, Migdal develops what he calls the 
‘state in society’ perspective, an anthropology of the state which portrays it as one of several 
groups competing over legitimate authority.  At each end of the continuum, there exist ideal 
types in which the state or society engulf one another.  Most political systems feature a degree of 
states incorporating societal forces or societal forces incorporating the state.4 
 Dauvergne makes a useful modification to Migdal’s approach in his analysis of forestry.  
Dauvergne’s analysis disaggregates state and societal power by policy sector.  Even weak states 
might dominate fiscal policy or road construction, which are high priorities with little social 
resistance.  In contrast, environmental laws are “generally a low priority for states”, but “are 
often quite threatening to nonstate organizations, particularly powerful businesses.”5  Thus, in 
the forestry sectors of large, resource-rich developing countries, states will be especially weak 
and social organizations such as corporations and militaries will be especially strong. 
 How do democratization and decentralization affect state capacity?  Migdal’s strong 
states are predominately democracies.  Democracy enhances participation and legitimacy, two of 
Migdal’s three indicators of social control, so that society acts through state institutions. 6  
Democracy alters societal power, promoting some actors such as associations, small businesses, 
the media, and NGOs while weakening societal powers which are more likely to rival the state, 
such as militaries or corporations.  If democracy takes root, decentralization may create a state 
which is more capable of achieving its goals because its units can best react to local conditions.  
If democracy is absent, decentralization may empower strong societal actors such as local 
strongmen or corporations to resist the state. 
 In many developing countries, the state remains weak because it fails to penetrate 
“weblike” social structures.  Patron-client relationships are instrumental interactions where 
clients bargain for access from patrons in exchange for support.  The patron may provide funds, 
resources, licenses, or protection in exchange for loyalty, rents, or support.  Although 
asymmetrical, these relationships are not always exploitative.  Patron-client relationships can be 
mutually beneficial, self-enforcing, personal, and difficult for weak states to overcome.  
Clientelism is a pyramid-shaped system of patron-client relationships in which most actors are 
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both patrons and clients at some level.  Such systemic patron-client relationships result in 
ineffective laws, weak state legitimacy, and insufficient tax revenue.  Compared to class, which 
fails to account for vertical relationships, and primordialism, which fails to account for networks 
between ethnic groups, clientelism provides an effective way to gauge power relations in 
developing countries.  It avoids pejorative terms such as corruption which suggest unorganized 
or intentionally damaging behavior.7 
Clientelism differs from neopatrimonialism, which advantages the top of a steeper 
pyramid.  The difference between clientelism and neopatrimonialism has important implications 
for decentralization.  Decentralization eliminates the top of the pyramid; in a clientelist system, 
this leaves a number of mid-level actors in positions of power, allowing elements of previous 
systems to survive.  For neopatrimonial systems, eliminating the patron will either change the 
system or result in another patron taking top spot.  For Indonesia, “a neopatrimonial framework 
has difficulty explaining the resilience of pervasive patronage after the fall of a superpatron.”8  
Clientelism offers a superior lens for this case due to the strength of mid-level actors.   
 How do democratization and decentralization alter clientelist systems?  Democracy alters 
patron-client relationships by improving the bargaining power of clients.  It may strengthen 
clientelism by defining the currency of support; leaders can “deliver favours to their supporters 
in return for votes.”9  In the case of Thailand, voting has reinforced clientelism in rural areas, as 
local strongmen (Chao Pho, godfathers) have mobilized clients to deliver them into office.10  
Democracy defined as voting is clearly insufficient.  It should empower social actors to resist 
vertical networks and challenge one-party rule, which is frequently a vehicle for patronage; 
democracy “empowers the powerless…and severs the psychological and structural bonds of 
clientelism.” 11   The impact of democracy on clientelism largely depends on the depth of 
democratization: public participation; interest groups, political parties, and civil society.  Like 
state incapacity, clientelism may be entrenched by decentralization if democratization has not 
first taken root.  If a state is democratic and strong, decentralization may provide local 
accountability, responsibility, and sustainability.  Without democracy, decentralization can 
simply remove the top layers of clientelism and entrench mid-level corruption, creating 
authoritarian enclaves and further undermining state capacity. 
 Clientelism is both a cause and an effect of weak states and strong societies.  Personalist 
networks compete with state power, drain resources, and capture state offices.  The relationship 
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between a weak state, clientelism, and illegal logging is complex.  The three are mutually 
reinforcing, while clientelism and illegal logging are also indicators of state capacity.  To combat 
illegal logging, a strong participatory state must come first.  These are the goals of 
democratization and decentralization, but are not always the result.  To enhance state power and 
mitigate clientelism, democracy must first be relatively entrenched, including a turnover of 
leaders, free media, active NGOs and a public which holds its leaders accountable.  
Decentralization is only effective if democratization is successful; otherwise, it will weaken state 
capacity and entrench clientelist networks, leading to an increase in illegal logging. 
 
II: Centralized Power & Illegal Logging in Indonesia 
Having detailed the theories which drive this study, I discuss them in terms of an increasingly 
decentralized Indonesia.  After describing the weak, clientelist, centralized state that was the 
New Order, I look at the environmental consequences.  In the next section, I will detail 
Indonesia’s radical decentralization and assess what this means for illegal logging. 
 For three centuries, the Dutch ruled the East Indies through local chiefs, but exercised 
direct control of rubber, tea, coffee, and sugar plantations.  Dutch rule became increasingly 
centralized in the nineteenth century as high colonialism took hold in response to a series of 
conflicts.  When Indonesia proclaimed its independence, the Dutch now demanded a federal 
system that could protect Christian enclaves, but Sukarno believed this would produce too much 
instability given ethnic and religious conflicts throughout thousands of islands.  Sukarno 
“established continuity with the Dutch colonial administration, in which a central government 
presided over the regions.”12  The President faced strong opposition on this from Vice President 
Hatta, Muslim leaders, and regional military commanders.  Sukarno began as a democrat, but as 
religious, ideological, and military rebellions grew, he shifted to ‘Guided Democracy’, a semi-
authoritarian system in which Sukarno balanced the military and communist forces through 
strong executive rule.  General Suharto took power through a ‘creeping coup’ after a muddled 
strike by communist leaders against the military, proclaiming a ‘New Order’ for Indonesia.13 
 The New Order was not a dictatorship in the strictest sense, but rather an oligarchy.  
Suharto did not rule directly.  The “father of development” (Bapak Pembangunan) ensured that 
his extended family as well as friends from the business community and military were granted 
monopolies, state corporations, and government agencies.  Suharto and his circle controlled 
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access to every level of power, leashing political parties, NGOs, and religious organizations.  
Any hopes of local autonomy that survived Sukarno were eliminated by Suharto in the name of 
security and development.  The New Order was “modernization theory made flesh.” 14  
Technocratic Five Year Plans focused on resource extraction, energy megaprojects, and 
transmigration.  Contracts were denied to regional elites in favour Suharto’s allies, organized 
through the Golkar Party.  Pertamina, the state oil company, personified the effects of Bapakism 
(fatherly rule).  Ruled by Suharto’s friend General Ibnu Sutowo, Pertamina was given hefty 
portions of state revenue, foreign investment, and control of oil reserves.  The company went 
bankrupt in the 1970s, with the state inheriting billions in debt; “long chains of clients extending 
downward from the directors’ closest confidents prospered while the organizational objectives 
failed.” 15   Clientelism drained state revenue and marginalized traditional elites, meanwhile 
enriching those with connections. 
 Nowhere was this as evident as the forestry sector.  Indonesia is home to vast rainforests, 
which under Indonesian law, belong to the state.  Suharto granted access to nearly half of 
Indonesia’s forests to his friends Bob Hasan (“the Plywood King”) and Prajogo Pangestu.  Local 
officials either rented access from these officials or turned to illegal logging.  Yields were not 
sustainable, reforestation was rare, rainforests were clearcut, rivers became silted, and landslides 
killed hundreds.  Corruption was rampant at all levels; in 1993, Tommy Suharto and Bob Hasan 
embezzled $87 million from Greenpeace’s Forest Renewal Programme, but were never 
convicted.16  The state saw only 8 to 30% of forestry revenue, losing rents, legitimacy, control, 
and the ability to reharvest.17  By the 1980s, powerful military and corporate actors had evolved 
their own networks beyond the Suharto family. 
Throughout the 1990s, illegal logging and draught led “the Haze” that choked out much 
of Southeast Asia.  In 1997, forest fires blanketed Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia in smoke, 
costing the region billions of dollars and threatening the health of millions.  Satellites found the 
cloud reached three million square kilometers.  This led to an Association of Southeast Asia 
(ASEAN) resolution to tackle illegal logging, but once again in 2006, the intersection of 
clearcuts and late monsoon rains created a regional cloud. 
The forestry sector shows how a centralized, clientelist regime can weaken state capacity 
and lead to economic, human, and environmental disasters.  Clientelism was entrenched by the 
New Order; even state loans were “underpinned by personal connections, not by collateral or 
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persuasive investment proposals.”18  This is a prototypical weak state, where the state and its 
laws are secondary to personal profits and social networks.  In 1998, this contributed to the 
collapse of Indonesia’s economy and the fall of Suharto, bringing five years of chaos and 
threatening the country with disintegration. 
 
III: Reformasi’s Radical Decentralization 
In recent years, Indonesia has undertaken radical experiments in political institutions.  
Decentralization was sought as a means to appease regional sentiments, make the government 
more responsive to local needs, and decrease the burden on Jakarta.  Indonesian reforms are part 
of a global trend in which “local officials are thought to be more aware of local needs, better 
situated to respond to these needs, and more accountable to local constituents for the results.”19  
Decentralization is also a means to improve participatory democracy; because states are not 
likely to shrink, “other ways must be found to reduce the scale of democracy…this means 
federalism and regional autonomy.” 20   But this is no golden key to progress.  Although 
decentralization promotes participation and reduces the likelihood of dictatorship, it may also 
lead to “authoritarian enclaves” in peripheral regions if the central government and society are 
too weak.21  We must not forget that Indonesia and several other countries became centralized 
regimes in partial response to overcome regional military units and avoid ethnic conflict.  The 
stakes of decentralization are high, however the potential benefit to a large country riddled with 
separatism and incapacity appealed to reformers. 
 The task of drafting Indonesian decentralization laws fell to political scientist Ryaas 
Rasjid and seven of his colleagues.  The results were Law 22/1999, the political aspects of 
decentralization, and Law 25/1999, which focused on fiscal matters.  The laws devolve power to 
the district (Kabupaten), as opposed to the provincial government, which became an extension of 
the central government.  Article Seven of Law 22/1999 reads that district governments are 
responsible for everything “except in the fields of international policies, defence and security, 
judiciary, monetary and fiscal policy, religion, and authorities in other fields.” 22   District 
governments inherit whatever is left, such as taxation, health, education, and resource 
management.  In Article Ten, district governments are given the responsibility for natural 
resources and the environment.  Districts retain 64% of resource revenue, with 16% going to the 
province and 20% to Jakarta.  Implementation has been occurred at breakneck speeds, completed 
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nineteen months after the laws were passed.  In 2000, thousands of bureaucrats were transferred 
to the districts.  Indonesian authorities have created five new provinces, over one hundred new 
districts, and countless new sub-district and village units.  House speaker Amien Rais even 
championed a federal model.  It is important to note that districts have gained responsibility, not 
authority, and that Indonesia remains a de facto unitary state. 
 Democratization may undermine or entrench clientelist systems.  Free and fair elections 
have returned new governments, including a directly elected President and, by the end of 2006, 
90% of provincial and district heads were directly elected as well.  Civil society, an independent 
media, new parties, and an increasingly capable anti-corruption movement have played 
important roles in mitigating clientelism.  But democratization has proceeded unevenly, creating 
a “Java—Outer Islands” dichotomy in which isolated governments retain characteristics and 
leaders from the New Order.23  Rural areas lack political opposition, an effective civil society, or 
an independent media.  As a result, “Suharto has gone, but those he favoured continue to 
flourish.”24  Due to a lack of pro-democracy forces, democratization has not changed clientelism 
a great deal in Outer Indonesia. 
 The ambiguity and pace of Indonesian decentralization has resulted in criticism.  The 
World Bank alleges that “two years in, it is unclear what has been decentralized.”25  First, district 
power is a residual of federal responsibilities, resulting in confusion.  Second, state agencies and 
old laws have not been updated to reflect these changes.  For instance, the Forestry Act still 
refers to provincial responsibilities which no longer exist.26  Clashes between federal, provincial, 
and district authorities have become more common.  Third, no minimum standards have been 
adopted for policies such as education, health, or resource extraction.  Fourth, there is a lack of 
human and technical resources in district governments, creating low quality, weak governments, 
especially in rural areas.  According to the World Bank, district governments are “very much a 
product of the New Order Regime…and without an authority figure, are free to pursue rent 
unchecked.”27  They add that “big ticket corruption may have fallen in absolute terms, while 
petty corruption under weaker political management may have increased.”28 
Despite these important criticisms, in some respects the ‘Big Bang’ has gone surprisingly 
well, with stability, economic growth, civil society, and democracy taking root across the 
country.  In parts of Indonesia, reforms have weakened the political power of the military and 
business, reduced corruption, and strengthened the rule of law.  New societal actors, such as the 
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media and NGOs, are critical of the government but mostly supportive of the state and its rules.  
Elections have produced a turnover in government officials, new political parties, and a more 
legitimate state.  But again, democratization has proceeded slowly in Indonesia’s periphery, 
where Suharto-era local leaders remain in control of corrupt, weak local states. 
 Figure One illustrates clientelism under Suharto.  The line on the right is an example of a 
patron-client network.  Figure Two illustrates changes since 2001.  In effect, the top layers have 
been peeled back, leaving the numerous district leaders at the top of a modified pyramid. 
 
 
Figure 1: Clientelism during the New Order 
 
 
Figure 2: Clientelism after the New Order 
 
 How should we react to disparate reports on institutional change in Indonesia?  To assess 
the effects of decentralization on state capacity, the state must be disaggregated by administrative 
level.  The central government is strongest due to its expertise, skilled leadership, and economy 
of scale.  With each step towards local government, society’s power grows in relation to the state.  
Especially in a country which has so quickly devolved responsibility to an increasing number of 
district governments, governments lack the ability to compete with strong societal actors such as 
corporations, and may even be captured by them.  Remote district-level governments lack 
expertise, stable sources of revenue, and strong societal actors such as civil society or the media, 
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but have nonetheless gained substantial powers.  Local strongmen and logging companies 
dominate a number of particularly weak states at the district level.  This presents a serious 
challenge to reformers, and has serious implications in many policy sectors. 
 Forestry provides an excellent avenue to assess Indonesian reforms.  The industry 
dominates the most remote, least democratic regions, and involves strong stakeholders who resist 
change.  Although difficult to measure, illegal forestry leaves a deeper footprint than do other 
sectors.  Since the fall of Suharto, forestry is “undergoing a transformation to become more 
fragmented and disorderly…Forestry corruption is being reshaped by the democratic transition 
and ‘messy’ decentralization.” 29   Meanwhile, district governments have become “more 
dependent on resource-based revenues [creating] incentives to accelerate land conversion and 
natural resource exploitation.”30  Reforms have made forestry revenue especially crucial to the 
most under-funded Kabupaten, which lack the will or the capacity to enforce environmental 
standards.  As a result, illegal logging continues in specific regions throughout the country. 
 As noted in Figure Three, official logging has declined since the fall of Suharto.  But 
Indonesia’s Department of Forestry’s annual report demonstrates that official statistics vary 
wildly.31  According to environmental NGO WALHI, illegal logging now varies considerably by 
district.32  It seems that logging has increased, but official logging has decreased, suggesting that 
the state remains incapable of asserting control in this policy area.  Although it is too early to tell 
if five years of reform have made significant changes in forest management, there are a few 
indicators available.33 
 
 
 
 An important indicator is the shift from the HPH (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan, Natural 
Forest Concession) to the HPHH (Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan, Forest Product Harvest License) 
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system.  The number of HPH have fallen from a dozen to zero in North Sumatra since 1998, 
whereas HPHH, smaller concessions granted by district governments, increased a thousand fold.  
In 2000, the Ministry of Forests realized that HPHH grants were out of control and rescinded the 
law, but many district heads (Bupati) ignored the ruling, claiming their right to local revenues.34  
The HPHH windfall and subsequent spike in logging was heaviest in Kalimantan and Papua, the 
most remote and logging-dependent regions in the country. 
Early evidence points towards tremendous fluctuation in permit grants according to direct 
elections for Bupati.  In Tapanuli Selatan (TAPSEL) district in North Sumatra, the changeover of 
Bupati from Saleh Harahap to Ongku Hasibuan has brought tremendous changes in forestry 
management.35  In Langkat district in the same province, local elections have not been held yet 
because the Bupati was appointed just before the new laws took effect, and accordingly, has 
some of the worst levels of illegal logging in the country.36  The same pattern is evident in Aceh, 
where because of the conflict, Bupati elections only took place in December 2006, and in a 
handful of districts not until 2008.  Post-tsunami reconstruction has been partially undermined by 
illegal logging controlled by district heads.37 
The longer the duration between decentralization and elections, the more difficult it may 
be to curb illegal logging, as districts without changes in governments have had longer to appoint 
forestry officers and distribute multi-year forestry concessions.  Decentralization seems to be 
paying dividends in regions that had early Bupati elections.  These regions have seen more 
arrests, active forestry police, fewer concessions, and stricter monitoring.  In areas with later 
elections, illegal logging has continued.  This suggests that local elections have brought 
improvements.  But in many remote districts, local elections were held early but have not made 
much progress.  According to John McCarthy, “decentralization “has worked to the advantage of 
entrenched regional elites” because elections have empowered “leaders rather than rural 
constituencies.”38  Many NGOs in South Kalimantan believe their province is not ready for 
decentralization, as Bupati have been turned into Raja-Raja Kecil (Small Kings) by the new laws.  
WALHI and Transparency International allege that where Bupati elections have been held, 
campaigns have been financed by logging corporations, resulting in heavy vote-buying and few 
turnovers.39  South Kalimantan has among the weakest political parties; candidates here are 
backed by a number of parties, whereas elsewhere, they are more likely to be members.  The 
exception in South Kalimantan is in the capital, Banjarmarsin, where the new Bupati Yudhi 
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Wahyuni, a member of Amien Rais’ PAN, has clashed with district leaders by leading local 
NGOs in an anti-corruption pilot project. 
Three types of districts emerge from this initial fieldwork.  First are districts with active 
civil societies, strong political parties, greater economic development, less dependency on single 
industries, and greater cooperation with provincial forestry bodies.  TAPSEL and Banjarmarsin 
have each benefited a great deal by direct local elections and decentralization.  Second are 
districts with steeper clientelist pyramids, more money politics, and vested interests in the status 
quo.  Districts in Kalimantan show that direct elections are not always effective, and where they 
are not, decentralization can entrench illegal logging.40  Finally, many regions have yet to hold 
direct elections, and show trends towards more illegal logging.  In Aceh and Langkat, it is 
unclear if recent or upcoming elections will arrest such trends, or if the longer duration of newly 
powerful, non-elected Bupatis will make change more difficult. 
 
IV: Looking Forward: Possible Solutions & Tentative Conclusions 
Without a change in local politics, decentralization can allow the inmates to run the asylum.  
According to Larry Diamond: 
Where hierarchical chains of particularistic, patron-client relationships are already the 
dominant mode of politics, shifting discretionary financial authority from the central to 
the local level may simply shift the locus of clientelism and corruption from the central to 
the local arena, making these problems even tougher to control because of the absence of 
the strong parties and countervailing interests that are found at the national level.41 
 
Kang makes similar observations in South Korea; authoritarian governments “eliminated the 
middleman, and while you had to pay for access, you could do it at the top levels, and not worry 
so much about the bureaucracy.”42  This phenomenon has also been documented in Eastern 
Russia.43  Where democratization is ineffective, decentralization entrenches clientelism.  Where 
democracy works, decentralization does as well.  In large developing countries, each outcome 
will likely be found due to inequalities between districts. 
 For decades, Indonesia has been a weak, clientelist state.  Democratization has brought 
many reforms, removed corrupt leaders, and entrenched the rule of law.  Decentralization has 
enhanced democracy through greater participation and local leadership.  Indonesian reforms are 
largely premised on the ability of “civil society organizations and the media [to] monitor and 
criticize government performance.”44  The World Bank notes that while government monitoring 
 13 
of illegal logging has decreased, civil society control has become a valid contributor in its 
place.45  But where democracy and civil society are weak, the ghosts of the New Order remain.  
Clientelism and state incapacity are still prominent, made worse by decentralization, which has 
granted substantial power to local strongmen.  Illegal logging provides an avenue to gauge the 
effects of decentralization on state capacity and clientelism, as well as discuss important 
ecological issues. 
Thus far, evidence of the effects of decentralization is anecdotal and mixed.  It is too 
early to be sure what the effects of district political power will be on the environment or state 
capacity.  It seems clear that some districts have benefited from local elections, improving 
forestry management even in the eyes of critical local NGOs.  It is also safe to say that 
decentralization has entrenched clientelism in remote regions.  More research is necessary as 
decentralization progresses to clarify the direction of democratization in remote districts. 
 Possible solutions may include greater federal oversight, clearer environmental laws, 
rotating bureaucrats from more prosperous regions, provincial policing, empowering civil society, 
rural education, or greater foreign pressure on corporations.  While much remains to be done, the 
importance of the study is clear.  The intersection of democratization and decentralization has 
concrete policy implications for environmental sustainability, local government accountability, 
and academic importance for several bodies of theory. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The project will explore variation among sub-national government capacity to curb illegal logging in Indonesia.  It 
focuses on subnational units at various levels of government and in a range of provinces.  Tentative cases include 
the province of North Sumatra, a district in Aceh, two districts and one sub-district in East Kalimantan, and one 
district and two sub-districts in South Kalimantan.  I expect the greatest variation to be at the district level, however 
I also disaggregate districts into sub-districts to gauge variation among specific villages.  My approach is influenced 
by Atul Kohli’s study of political disorder in India.  Kohli believes that “any satisfactory account of India’s 
changing authority patterns must focus simultaneously on the center, the states, and local politics.”  Not only does 
Kohli study various levels of government, he ensures variation among them according to level of development and 
form of instability.  For Indonesia, Aceh represents a resource-rich region impoverished by military rule.  North 
Sumatra represents a stable, relatively prosperous case with an active civil society.  East Kalimantan has a 
diversified economy which includes oil deposits, as well as overland routes to Malaysia which facilitate illegal 
logging.  South Kalimantan’s economy is more dependent on forestry, isolated, and home to a greater degree of 
traditional rule.  For each, forestry is central to the economy.  Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s 
Growing Crisis of Governability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 11. 
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Back In, edited by Peter Evans et al (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 20. 
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